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1INTRODUCTION
Descriptions of split-brain patients raise the ques-
tion whether they each have one mind or two. Thomas Nagel,
in “Brain-Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness," argues
as though the determining factor in assessing this question
were whether the patients were in ordinary or in experimental
situations. But the difference between the one-mind view,
and the two-minds view does not depend on the experimental
situation per se; it depends upon whether or not the behav-
ioral strategies used by patients in the experimental situa-
tion are permitted, and upon the explanation offered of these
strategies. Because the difference between these views de-
pends upon the explanation of strategies, the crux of the
dispute is the relation held to obtain between a subject
and the contents of his mind. If this relation is held to
be one of direct access or introspection, then split-brain
patients each have two minds. If strategies are described
as passing information and afforded the status of mental
events, then split-brain patients have one mind each.
Given an account of the mechanisms involved in strate-
gies, and an account of the mind which embodies those mechan-
isms, the one-mind view is more plausible. An account of
the mind relying on the possibility of parallel processes
which can permit intelligent actions to proceed without
reflective attention and without permitting introspection,
offers a more plausible alternative than that of the two-
2
minds view. The two-minds view cannot account for the use
of strategies as well as the parallel-process view of con-
sciousness. Moreover, if the parallel process view is cor-
rect, the two-minds view must incorporate its major features
anyway. As the two-minds view has serious conceptual diffi-
culties of its own, and constitutes an addition, rather than
an alternative to the parallel process view, it is unacceptable.
3PHYSIOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
Research on patients with bisected brains, in which
the commissures connecting the hemispheres were severed or
are congenitally missing, is philosophically interesting
because it raises a number of issues concerning the nature
of consciousness, and the relation of mind to body. These
questions arise in a distinctly physiological context. The
philosophical issues obviously cannot be resolved by appeal-
ing to the facts in the case-histories of split-brain patients.
The conceptual gap between the physical condition or observ-
able behavior of the patient, and the attribution of con-
sciousness, or the description of the mind prevent this sort
of solution. Philosophical grounds for ascribing conscious-
ness and philosophical descriptions of the mind are required.
The obvious question is why one would want to give a
philosophical account so closely tied to neurological research.
Descriptions of split-brain patients show that they appear
to have multiple consciousness, at least under certain condi-
tions* they lack, behavioral features formerly assumed to be
typical of persons possessing single, unified minds. It be-
comes crucially important to understand what these descrip-
tions presume as conditions of consciousness and how it is
experimentally demonstrated that these conditions are met.
Researchers must establish that the right and left hemispheres
4of the patient's brain demonstrate that they satisfy these
sufficient conditions, as well as that they independently
satisfy these conditions. Unsurprisingly, these contentions
are difficult to establish. In the first place, it is diffi-
cult to establish whether certain functions of the cerebral
hemispheres are performed independently of the lower brain
and spinal cord. Unless this fact can be established, there
is no reason to claim that the hemispheres are independently
capable of consciousness. Secondly, most interesting candi-
dates for sufficient conditions for consciousness are them-
selves capacities; the data on the functions of the hemispheres
relies on the fact that under certain conditions, the patient
is incapable of exercising those functions. Strong claims
are made concerning the patient's capacities as evinced by
failure to respond. These claims must be examined.
Descriptions of the sorts of behavior exemplified by
split-brain patients manifesting disconnection syndromes,
or loss of certain functions, must be examined. General
accounts of disconnection syndromes center on the function
of the great cerebral commissures, those fiber bundles
con-
necting the hemispheres of the brain, notably the corpus
callosum. Myers discovered that a cat with a sectioned
corpus callosum could not perform tasks learned by
manipulat-
ing one front paw, if the animal were forced to
try to use
the other front paw. This result followed only
if sectioning
had occurred prior to learning; cats which were
sectioned
after learning could switch paws and perform the tasks easily.
Myers and Sperry then performed other tests
,
attempting to
establish that the function of the corpus callosum was to
permit the transfer of information from one hemisphere to
the other.
While the hemispheres of the cat's brain seem to dupli-
cate each other, so that sectioning after learning leaves
both sides capable of performing the learned tasks, this re-
sult does not follow in primates. In monkeys, some tasks
learned before sectioning will be performed indiscriminately
by either left or right limbs; other tasks appear to be
limited to only one set of limbs. In neurological jargon,
cats are said to "lay down engrams" (or memory traces) in
both hemispheres of the brain, while monkeys sometimes lay
down engrams on one side, and sometimes on both, depending
on the task.
Humans have specialized functions in opposite hemispheres,
though the evidence on whether these differences depend on
the physiological structures of the hemispheres or develop
only through use is inconclusive. This is an important
point in contending theories of the possibility of multiple
consciousness; critics of the two-minds view argue for innate
differences in capabilities, while proponents of the two-
minds view argue for the development of different capacities.
Theories on this subject are closely related to studies of
cerebral dominance, handedness, and speech capacity. In
6humans, limb control, vision, and audition are controlled
chiefly contralaterally : the left hemisphere of the brain
controls the right side of the body, and vice-versa. The
sense of smell is notably ipsilateral with the right hemi-
sphere of the brain controlling the right side. Somesthetic
sensation is predominantly contralateral, but crude informa-
tion is given ipsilaterally
. Finally, the muscles of the
face and neck can be operated by both the right and left
hemispheres of the brain. ^ The correlation of dominance and
speech gives most people left-hemisphere speech centers. If
severing the commissures effectively segregates the hemi-
spheres of the brain, then one would expect that the right
hemisphere would be effectively isolated from speech, while
the left side of the body would be unable to perform tasks
dependent upon the specialized capabilities of the right
hemisphere of the brain.
These expectations appear to be fulfilled, at least
during experimental situations where strategies were identi-
fied and prevented. Objects placed out of sight in the pa-
tient's left hand could not be verbally identified by the
patient, and the subjects scored no better than chance if
asked which of several objects they were holding. Presumably,
the subjects did not know. But if they were permitted to use
their left hand to point to a picture of the object (selected
J-The idioms expressing apparent independence of the left
and right hemispheres enter early; all that is intended here is
that information and movement is subject to bilateral control.
7from a group) or a written word identifying the object held,
the subjects were able to do this task correctly. On the
other hand, spatial relations appear to be a special task
of the right hemisphere of the brain. Although all of the
patients were right-handed, none of the patients could copy
simple geometric figures with the right hand, although they
could do fairly well with the left.
On the basis of experiments such as these, experimenters
concluded that it was utterly misleading to accept the verbal
testimony as indicative of the knowledge possessed by the
subjects. They concluded that the left hemisphere of the
brain could not "speak" for the right, and they began to
accord the "sides" of the patient's body independent status
as experimental subjects. There are certain problems v/ith
this approach. In the first place, in some experimental
situations, patients failed to manifest the expected separa-
tion of function, and the patients were capable of performing
certain tasks which were theoretically impossible, given the
experimenters' assumptions. Some of these tasks were traced
to particular strategies used by the patients, though for
other tasks the ability to integrate behavior could not be
determined to be based on strategies. Secondly, two cate-
gories of cases in the split-brain literature failed to ex-
hibit the expected disconnection syndromes. Subjects lacking
the corpus callosum from birth tended to perform as normal
subjects on the psychological tests devised for split-brain
8patients
.
Various explanations are offered for these cases
i
either the subjects are described as having developed sepa-
rate capabilities in the different hemispheres, or they are
asserted to be relying upon alternate neurological pathways
for the transfer of information. Other patients, notably
those whose epilepsy was not cured by sectioning, also fail
to exhibit disconnection syndromes. In most cases, these
patients did not undergo the same psychological testing as
the split-brain patients did; some experimenters thus attrib-
ute their failure to exhibit disconnection syndromes to unde-
tected strategies, which were not prevented. Others, noting
the similarities between the electrical activity postulated
to account for learning and that involved in epileptic
seizures, noting that the seizures were not prevented, sug-
gested that the patients were using the same sort of pathways
permitting seizures to pass information from one hemisphere
to the other. At the very least, disconnection syndromes are
not yet fully understood.
After giving accounts of the behavior of split-brain
patients in normal and experimental situations, taken to indi-
cate either single or multiple consciousness, I will consider
a possible account of the behavioral integration displayed in
these situations. The most interesting explanations attempt
to reveal strategies used to pass information from one hemi-
sphere to the other, where prevention of these strategies
causes a loss of integrated behavior of certain kinds.
9Briefly, I contend that consciousness is identified by Nagel
and by others, with acting in a functionally integrated
manner. What it is, which is functionally integrated, varies
in descriptions of split-brain patients. Nagel, for example,
refers to the integration of stimuli, as well as to the inte-
gration of overt behavior. Other accounts of consciousness
describe behavioral routines as displaying functional inte-
gration as overt behavior, and refer to the intentions behind
such integration. The lack of unanimity, or even consistency,
in descriptions of what is integrated, and how it is inte-
grated leads to a confusion of mental and physical events,
as well as to a confusion of introspection and integration.
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SPLIT-BRAIN PATIENTS' BEHAVIOR
AND STRATEGIES
The most obvious fact concerning split-brain patients'
behavior is their ability to perform simple and even complex
tasks easily, without apparent confusion, or loss of coordi-
nation. Their ability to perform most tasks after the sever-
ance of the commissures is comparable to their level of
performance prior to the operation; this ability requires an
explanation. Apparently, either the tasks were ones which
the patients had " over learned" and could do almost automati-
cally, or the patient could watch himself performing the
task, and so coordinate his activities. Norman Geschwind
writes in Disconnexion Syndromes in Animals and Man (p. 624):
We were perplexed by this at first, but then realized
that as long as each hemisphere had learned its task
such bimanual activities could be carried out. In
our case, a command to tie the shoelaces would thus
have been conveyed to the left hemisphere; the right
hand would then move to begin the task. But the visual
regions of the right hemisphere would thus receive
visual stimulation and proceed to do its share of the
task. Presumably, a more careful analysis of the
latencies with which each hand began to do its task,
would have helped prove this mechanism.
Geschwind suggests that it is the ability to watch one side
performing the tasks which leads to coordinated activity.
There were two patients who failed to perform normally
even under normal conditions, at least on occasion.
11
2 .Geschwind cites Kurt Goldstein's description of a patient
with a sectioned corpus callosum:
I have pointed out the presence in my patient of a
feeling of strangeness in relation to movements of
the left hand which she described with such curious
expressions (she would say that someone was moving
her hand and that she wasn't doing it herself) that
she was regarded at first as a paranoiac. (p. 638)
Sperry and Myer ' s first patient also tended to experience
what are described as conflicts between the right and the
left hand. Sperry writes, "The patient and his wife used to
refer to the 'sinister left hand' that sometimes tried to
push the wife away aggressively at the same time that the
hemisphere of the right hand was trying to get her to come
and help him with something.
11 ^ This same patient is further
described by Gazzaniga (in The Bisected Drain , p. 107):
Once he grabbed his wife with his left hand and
shook her violently, while with his right ^trying . to
come to his wife's aid in bringing the left belliger-
ent hand under control. Once, while I was playing
horseshoes with the patient in the backyard he
happened to pick up an axe leaning against the house
with his left hand. Because it was entirely likely
that the aggressive right hemisphere might be in
control, I discreetly left the scene--not wanting
to be the victim for the test-case of which he
If
brain does society punish or execute.
It is possible that these patients had difficulty
m coordi-
nating their movements, or in coordinating
their emotions
and their movements because of other types
of brain damage.
2Norman Geschwind, "Disconnexion Syndrome;
Man" (in Brain 88, 1965), p. 638.
in Animals and
3R. W. Sperry, "Brain
Consciousness" (in Eccles,
p. 304.
Bisection and the Mechanisms of
ed.
,
Brain and Conscious^ Exper ience )
,
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This factor has been offered in explanation of the behavior
of Sperry's patient. The interesting factor in the explana-
tions of the experience of these patients lies in the coup-
ling of their behavior with their subjective experience of
their behavior as unintegrated; only Goldstein's patient ex-
perienced this disintegration.
In considering the results of the test-situations, one
finds the use of strategies to be an important factor in pro-
ducing integrated behavior. When the subject was prevented
from using strategies to pass information "around the split,"
disruption of some functions resulted. The disrupted func-
tions varied, depending upon the nature of the experiment;
behavior routines which were not being tested concurrently
4
did not evince disruption. Gazzaniga describes several
types of strategy, such as target information crossover, eye
divergence, emotional cross-cuing, ipsilateral somatosensory
"leakage," and perhaps most interesting, cooperative strate-
gies. A few examples of various of these strategies follow.
Monkeys confounded researchers' expectations with their
ability to retrieve objects using the ipsilateral hand and
eye (when the use of either opposing hand and eye were pre-
vented). By examining slow-motion films of the monkeys'
actions, researchers identified the strategy of target infor-
mation crossover. Although without the slow-motion film, the
4Michael Gazzaniga, The Bisected Brain , Chapter 6.
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monkeys appeared to simply reach out and grasp the object,
they were in fact using visual information to orient the
head, neck, and shoulders toward the object, and then using
this postural information to guide their reach. Some monkeys
were discovered to have had their eyes shut when they reached
to retrieve the object. Experiments were then done, in which
the monkeys' heads were restrained; the monkeys proved unable
to retrieve objects under these conditions.
It was anticipated that subjects with sectioned commis-
sures would be unable to make visual-visual comparisons in-
volving the use of both eyes. Most subjects proved unable
to do so. But some patients could tell whether a line was
continuous or discontinuous, even when the discontinuity
occurred at the break in their visual fields. The patients
were using eye divergence to discover the difference. Using
the facial muscles of one "side" to control both eyes, the
patient would place the fixation points of both eyes at the
height of the line perceptible to that side; the subject then
waited to find whether the other "side" would raise or lower
the fixation point. The change, if there was one, was per-
ceptible; this strategy was repeated, v/ith greater and greater
refinement, until the lack of further response indicated to
the subject whether the lines were continuous or discontinuous.
Cooperative strategies offer a refinement of feedback
strategies such as eye divergence? they oiler more information
14
to the sides. Trevarthen reported that one monkey with a
split-brain was consistently able to make visual-visual com-
parisons across hemispheres in one experiment; the monkey was
able to identify the larger of two circles in different visual
fields. After extensive testing, Trevarthen 6 conceded the
possibility that the visual mechanism involved in the dis-
l
I
crimination was sub-cortical, and thus unaffected by the
7
split. Gazzaniga proposed an alternative explanation. The
monkey had devised a strategem, rather like calculating the
odds in playing blackjack against an opponent. In Trevarthen'
s
experiment, five circles of various sizes were used, and after
several trials, each "side" had become familiar with their
relative sizes. (For convenience, I will refer to the
largest as 1, and so on.) Each side was to respond immedi-
ately if it recognized the larger circle, by pressing a
button on that side.
Because each side knew the relative sizes of the circles
each would respond immediately if it saw 1. Similarly, each
side responded immediately if it saw 5, by pressing the but-
ton for the opposite side. And all the other possibilities
were decided through the use of response latencies. If one
side had 2, it waited for the other's response; observing
5C. B. Trevarthen, cited by Gazzaniga, ibid., p. 102.
^Ibid.
,
p. 102
.
7 Ibid.
,
pp. 102-103.
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that the other side did not respond immediately (as it must
to have 1), the side with 2 would indicate that as the
larger circle. If 4 was shown in combination with 3, the
side recognizing 4 hesitates; if the other side does not
press the opposite button indicating it recognizes 5, the
side with 4 presses the opposite button to indicate that it
has the smaller circle. To test whether this strategy was
indeed being used, the number of circles to be discriminated
among was increased to ten; the subjects were unable to re-
spond correctly. This result was consistent with the finding
the subjects could not make visual-visual color comparisons.
All of the strategies employed have common features:
they are all performed in situations in which the subjects
(both sides) understand the task to be performed, and are
able to structure the situation with their bodies by using
response latencies. They structure the situations using
latencies, in such a way that failure to responct is signifi-
cant to the side lacking direct information. There are seri-
ous limitations on the amount of information that can be
transferred in this way. First, the situation must be some-
how defined so that the required action is either obvious to
both sides, or so that if one side "initiates" an action, the
other can grasp what is required of it. How this structuring
is done is not obvious; it is a very fundamental problem,
be-
cause much of the vaunted "independence" of the hemispheres
on explication of the initiation of action by therides
16
hemispheres, or the claim that the hemispheres observe each
other. Secondly, the mode of information transfer must admit
the lack of response to count as significant, constituting
a form of feedback; this indicates whether more information
is required, or whether there is sufficient information for
"overt" action using that information. Finally, the subject
must be free either to react or not to react, if the lack of
response of one side is to constitute an informative response.
Preventing strategies requires the control of these factors;
either the experimental situation is made more complex, and
thus unamenable to structuring, or the subject is restrained
so that the lack of response is no longer informative. In
essence, the experimental restrictions serve to saturate the
subject's medium of communication, or to block it altogether.
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INTEGRATED BEHAVIOR, INTROSPECTION,
AND STRATEGIES
Confusion concerning whether each split-brain patient
has one mind or two is a consequence of the confusion of two
models of consciousness. One model relies upon verbal media-
tion, and is necessarily serial; introspection and the concept
of a stream of consciousness are commonly assimilated to this
model. The second model relies upon parallel processes, and
incorporates verbal mediation as one of these processes;
other activities proceed concurrently. On this latter inter-
pretation not all of our behavior can be introspected concur-
rently. The unity of consciousness on this model does not
require the ability to perceive the relations among experiences.
A crucial feature of this model is thus the way in which
these parallel processes are conceived as unified subjective
experience. Although the parallel model is given as a de-
scription of the consciousness of normal persons, it can be
adapted to serve as a description of the experience of split-
brain patients. The primary virtue of this adaptation is
that it rids us of the temptation to equip split-brain pa-
tients with mental processes which are both parallel and
introspectible.
On the single string, serial model of consciousness
,
action is mediated solely by verbal intervention. The input
18
system sees uhe object end names it* a verbal mediator, using
the name of the object, names an appropriate action, which is
then executed by the output system. There are several obvi-
ous difficulties with this model, as a description of con-
sciousness. ! irst, it fails even as a model of perception.
Studies of perceptual difficulties, as well as of language
difficulties, have demonstrated that the inability to name
an object does not preclude the ability to recognize it, or
to demonstrate that recognition through the use of the object.
But the major failing of this model lies in the requirement
for a central executive which controls all the activities of
the system. This model is manifestly false, as there are
forms of intelligent action, such as complicated sensori-
motor routines, which do not require an arch-controller. Much
of our ordinary behavior consists of these routines; once
learned, they no longer require conscious attention. Finally,
some of our actions may depend upon conditional responses
which are attuned to certain "thresholds" on gradients of
sensory input; any attempt to give a verbal account of these
processes is doomed to failure. Verbal mediation cannot be
a prerequisite of all conscious action.
If verbal mediation is not a prerequisite of all con-
scious action, it is inappropriate to regard verbalizable
knowledge as a paradigm of all knowledge. If verbalizability
is not a necessary condition of knowledge, then we need some
other account. This account is given explicitly in the
19
refutation of conscious action as necessarily verbal iz able *
it is the ability to use the object. Michael Arbib^ suggests
"We normally ignore the linguistic level and instead explore
the idea that the 'meaning' of an input for an organism re-
sides in the interactions that are appropriate with the ob-
ject it represents
,
which actions depend not only on what an
object is, but on where it is." In short, meaning is use,
and is therefore necessarily context-dependent.
A parallel system incorporates a verbal mediator, which
receives information from the input system and which may send
instructions to a non-verbal sensori-motor center to "desig-
nate" an action. The significant difference between the
serial and parallel models is that the sensori-motor center
can operate without the intervention of the verbal system, in
"designating" an action to be performed by the output system.
These actions may be quite complicated, and involve very
sophisticated routines. The sensori-motor center is certainly
capable of intelligent action, as Arbib describes it. Briefly,
to be capable of intelligent action is to be capable of per-
9
ceiving "features of a situation beyond 'raw sensation.'"
He gives as features of intelligent action: the possession of
a modifiable model of the world, in terms of the potentiality
of interaction with its features; flexibility and generality
^Michael Arbib, The Metaphorical Brain , p. 166.
-
3 Ibid.
,
pp. 93-94.
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in these interactions; the ability to plan. D. M. MacKay
suggests that intelligent action "makes use of the correla-
tions and regularities observable, to improve the strategy
of control of adaptive action." 10
The possibility that the sensori-motor center may
operate independently of the verbal mediator is very impor-
tant; it makes the parallel system an anarchic one. The
parallel model lacks a central executive, and some explana-
tion must be given of the organism's ability to act in an
integrated manner. For example, there is nothing to preclude
the possibility that the verbal mediator may order one action,
while the sensori-motor system is engaging in ordering a
wholly incompatible action. Somehow there must be a priority
system which can choose among competing possible courses of
action; this priority system determines which segment has
the more important information, and gives control of the
organism to that segment, though presumably only for the
duration of that action. Warren McCullough describes this
as the problem of redundancy of potential command, and formu-
lated a principle for its resolution. Roughly, the principle
is that the situation in which the organism finds itself
designates the action of the organism, in conjunction with
10D. M. MacKay
Control of Action"
ence )
,
p. 429.
"Cerebral Organization and the Conscious
(in Eccles
,
ed.
,
Brain and Conscious Experi-
11McCul lough
,
cited in Arbib, op. cit. , pp. 17 10
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the organism's goals. McCullough offered as illustration
the strategy employed by the United States Navy in World
War II in assigning command in battle; the first ship to
sight the enemy assumed command, whether or not it was the
flagship in which command of the fleet normally resided.
Thus, the redundancy of potential command is resolved because
the situation chooses the "actor."
The interest of the parallel model lies in the possi-
bility of assimilating the account of the consciousness exem-
plified by split-brain patients to a model of consciousness
applicable to normal people. The ability of split-brain pa-
tients to use strategies to integrate their behavior, in
contexts where both hemispheres share goals and can use con-
textual information to grasp the significance of the other
side's response, is then merely an instance falling under
McCullough's principle; the hemispheres of the split-brain
patient's brain can be accommodated as parallel processes.
There are major questions which are not answered, however; the
simple expedient of pointing out that split-brain patients
observable behavior approximates that of normal patients,
does not answer whether or not split-brain patients experi-
ence is markedly different from that of normal subjects. The
most important question concerns the relation of the principle
preventing conflict of action, to our subjective experience.
The key point here lies in the fallacy of the passive
perceiver. The belief in a serial, introspectible
22
consciousness is conditioned by the belief that objects
simply are "out there," and impress themselves upon us by
means of our senses. We simply see them. The idea that we
have direct access to our senses simply reinforces this view.
But perception itself is action oriented; we notice things
12for a purpose. Things exist as sets of features whose
further discrimination depends upon our assessment of their
use in the light of potential actions. The ability to re-
solve the redundancy of potential command is thus a condition
of our discrimination of objects; it determines what we per-
ceive. The ability to resolve parallel processes into non-
conflicting actions makes our subjective experience possible.
We attend to all kinds of sensory events proceeding at once
around us, but because we transform them into objects only
in the context of our own goals and can finally only intro-
spect the results of the organization of those goals (and not
the process), we recognize a series of perceptions. The unity
of consciousness on this view refers, not to the ability to
experience (in any introspectible sense) the relations of
experience, but to the unity of the organizing system, choosing
^Unless of course, we have the additional time and inter
est to note things for their own sake. But it is a mistake
to assume that all of our noticing is of this sort; not all, ^
or even most, of our perceptions are garnered in this "aimless
fashion. The ability to perceive sense-data disinterestedly,
although they may be "meaningless" themselves, and to remember
them later, poses a very difficult problem for any theory of
perception’ but particularly for this one. The difficulty
with appealing to the "goals of the organism" lies in giving
an explanation of memory which can account for the _ ability to
store and later locate apparently useless information in con-
texts where it has meaning.
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from among various possible actions. The integration condi-
tion is a necessary condition of introspectible consciousness,
but integration cannot be introspected.
In order for the integration of sense-data to be intro-
spectibly conscious, the sense-data themselves must be intro-
spectibly conscious and their relations empirically discoverable.
If their relations are empirically discoverable, then it must
be possible to observe that these relations do not obtain and
to be conscious that they do not. There is, however, a logi-
cal impossibility in assuming that one and the same subject
can perceive his perceptions as isolated in his consciousness*
if he perceives them, they are necessarily his but if they
are not his, he cannot perceive them to lack relationships,
simply because he cannot perceive them. The observation of
the mind by itself is logically impossible. Without con-
sciousness, of introspectible consciousness, portions of the
brain may reciprocally monitor one another; portions of the
mind, however, are inherently absurd.
The fallacy of confusing the two conditions lies in the
attempt to demonstrate that the split-brain patient perceives
objects independently, in this introspectible way. It is
when perception is taken to be a passive process, enabling
us to see exactly what we observe consciously so that
we
seem to have "direct access" to our perceptions,
that we are
tempted to hold the view that split-brain patients
have two
streams of consciousness, two introspectible minds,
or two
24
selves (with attendant self-consciousness). This view is
illusory. Either we must be content with a perfectly mechani-
cal process which passively registers the presence of objects,
or we assimilate the behavior of the "sides" of split-brain
patients to the parallel processes described. It is unclear
how one would make the transition from a passive perceiver-
object namer to a conscious aqent; if we account for the
inability of the left hemisphere to describe what is happen-
ing on the right, the ability of the right hemisphere to
identify objects independently of the left's is not an argu-
ment for its independent self-consciousness. The claim that
the right hemisphere is self-conscious because it perceives
objects, requires the use of a model of active perception.
But this claim cannot be substantiated, for it requires
its own hierarchy of perception; it requires that there be a
mechanism for the resolution of redundancy of potential com-
mand which is independent of the left hemisphere. The diffi-
culty with this requirement is that it takes independent
priority systems to set goals, one for the left hemisphere
and one for the right; it is extremely difficult to prove
that this is possible. The difficulty lies in structuring
an experiment which could prove this volitional independence.
Only one experiment had been addressed specifically to this
issue.13 A monkey was allowed to choose with one hand between
red or green grapes, where the green grapes were treated
with
l^Qazzaniga, op. cit.
,
p. 144.
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quinine; offered a choice with the other hand between un-
treated red and green grapes, the monkey did not hesitate
to eat the green ones. The defect in Gazzaniga's experiment,
as he realized, lies in demonstrating that the monkey did not
simply adopt a conditional experiment. Finally, the claim
that hemispheres act independently in other experimental
situations is dubious at best; it rests on the premise that
because the data of the experimental situation were restricted
perceptually to one hemisphere, the purpose of the experiment
(e.g., to match words with pictures) was restricted to that
hemisphere .'1' 4 Finally, taking such structured evidence as
indicative of purpose is at best misleading; it seems more
plausible to argue that the purpose is that of the experi-
menter
.
My intention here has been to demonstrate that if we
assume the right hemisphere to be an utterly passive per-
ceiver, then there is no temptation to consider it conscious;
a machine which names objects is only more sophisticated than
a machine which reads numbers off checks, and there is no
need to consider either of them conscious. If we abandon a
passive model of perception, and attempt to give an account
of consciousness in terms of the ability to discriminate
features as significant in the light of some purpose, then
^Indeed if this were so, it would be difficult to recon-
cile Thomas Nagel's claim that the right hemisphere follows
instructions with Gazzaniga's observation that there is no
evidence that the right hemisphere understands verbs at all.
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it becomes increasingly harder to justify attributing inde-
*
pendent consciousness to the hemispheres, because it becomes
increasingly difficult to discern what could cause subjec-
tively important differences in significance. Any differ-
ences in the experimental subject's perceptions in experiments
are features of the experiments, and not of his consciousness.
The crux of this argument is whether subjects occasion-
ally manifest conflicting modes of behavior, and whether they
are subjectively aware of them. For this, there is only
Goldstein's "paranoiac" patient, and Sperry's patient whose
left hand occasionally got out of control. Goldstein's pa-
tient described her hand as moving without her, while Sperry's
patient complained of tingling on occasion when it moved, in
the months following surgery.
Integrated behavior is thus a condition of conscious-
ness which appears to preclude the possibility of multiple
consciousness in any introspectible , or self-conscious sense;
parallel intelligent behavior, however, is not limited to
split-brain patients.
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INTEGRATED BEHAVIOR AND INTROSPECTION
Researchers describing the results of split-brain ex-
periments tend to offer alternative grounds for ascribing
single or multiple consciousness to each of their subjects;
on the one hand, they cite the ability to act in a function-
ally integrated manner, and on the other, they rely on the
*
ability to demonstrate awareness through testimony. The
experimental data cited by researchers in support of the con-
tention that split-brain patients exemplify integrated behav-
ior is used to claim that the behavior is more than simply
intelligent. But no clear case is made for the contention
that this behavior does demonstrate that split-brain patients
do have parallel, introspectible consciousness which cannot
be assimilated to a parallel model. The two models of con-
sciousness are confused in descriptions offered of the mental
states of split-brain patients. The claim that split-brain
patients are multiply conscious appears to be either relatively
trivial and true, or interesting and false.
Norman Geschwind writes in Disconnexion Syndromes in
Animals and Man (p. 635):
If the ability to give a verbal account is a pre-
requisite of consciousness, then only the left hemi-
sphere was conscious; if the ability to respond in a
highly organized manner, and use the results of past
experiences constitutes consciousness, then he has
multiple consciousness.
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Sperry states in "Brain Bisection and the Mechanisms of Con-
sciousness" (p. 303 of Brain and Conscious Experience ):
Everything that we have seen so far indicates that
the surgery left these people with two separate minds,
that is, two separate spheres of consciousness. What
is experienced in the right hemisphere seems to be
entirely outside the realm of awareness of the left
hemisphere. This mental division has been established
with regard to perception, cognition, volition, learn-
ing, and memory
. . .
Sperry is here referring to the responses of subjects in ex-
perimental situations; later, he adds, "The presence of con-
scious apprehension in a hemisphere is hardly demonstrable in
the absence of some mode of expression. If speech and writing
are excluded, as they are in the minor hemisphere or in other
kinds of brain damage, more devious testing procedures are
required." Finally, when pressed in discussion as to whether
the experimental results justify the attribution of multiple
consciousness in split-brain patients, Sperry states, "I can
only go back to the statement that someone made here yester-
day—namely, that we tend to infer consciousness by analogy;
in people, we accept it, and in objects, we don't" (p. 311).
Thomas Nagel addresses himself to the question of
multiple consciousness. In "Brain-Bisection and the Unity of
Consciousness," he writes:
There may be other grounds for the ascription of con-
scious mental states that are sufficient even without
verbalization. And in fact, what the right hemisphere
can do on its own is too elaborate, too intentionally
directed, and too psychologically intelligible to be
regarded merely as a collection of unconscious auto-
matic responses ... it is able to respond to complex
visual and auditory stimuli, including language, and
it can control the performance of discriminatory and
manipulative tasks.
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Nagel concludes here "... the right hemisphere displays
enough awareness of what it is doing to justify the attribu-
tion of conscious control in the absence of verbal testimony."
Nagel does not conclude that the subjects do have multiple
consciousness, because Nagel offers other grounds for the
attribution of consciousness. Later, Nagel offers an account
of the unity of consciousness.
Nagel's account of the unity of consciousness differs
from the account offered in the description of the parallel-
process model of consciousness. The unity of consciousness
on that account concerned the integration of the parallel
processes through the resolution of redundancy of potential
command; the unity is unity of goals. Nagel's account offers
"some assumptions about the unity of consciousness that are
basic to our understanding of another individual as a person."
He writes:
We assume that a single mind has sufficiently imme-
diate access to its conscious states so that, for
elements of experience or other mental events occurring
simultaneously or in close temporal proximity, the
mind which is their subject can also experience the
simpler relations among them if it attends to the mat-
ter. . . . The experiences of a single person are
thought to take place in an experientially connected
domain, so that relations among experiences can be
substantially captured in the experience of those
relations
.
Nagel notes that in experimental situations, split-brain
patients flagrantly fail to meet these conditions. He also
points out that both hemispheres of a split—brain patient s
mind are remarkably well-integrated. There are two major
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ambiguities in Nagel s account ] one is "elements of experi—
ence or other mental events," while the other concerns what
it is to have "sufficiently immediate access."
The unity of the members of a series of experiences
which makes them the experience of a single objective world,
is a necessary condition of consciousness; these experiences
are thought to be accessible to a single subject. Split-
brain patients' hemispheres share certain more or less crude
sensory inputs in normal situations, which they are prevented
from sharing in experimental situations. So depending upon
how "elements of experience or other mental events" is to be
interpreted, it can refer either to crude, sensory input,
or to an introspectible awareness of the presence of an ob-
ject. An equivocation in the description of mental events
results in the immediate possibility of an equivocation of
the subject(s) of that experience, with the equivocation only
becoming apparent in shifts from normal to experimental situa-
tions .
There is a second, related difficulty with this loose
description of mental events. If we want to postulate that
split-brain patients are each multiply conscious, we have
to deny that each patient experiences a single, objective
world; otherwise, the suggestion of multiple consciousness
is without interest. It would appear then that either each
split—brain patient is not capable of consciousness at all,
which is not the result that we intended, or that each patient
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somehow has more than one set of experiences; these sets of
experiences make up more than one world. This latter result
implies two alternatives. Either the two sets of experiences
(elements of experience or other mental events) are systemati-
cally integrated in some way, prior to the patient's subjec-
tive, introspec tib le experience, so that his subjective
experience is unified; or a split—brain patient represents
two subjects, with separate spheres of consciousness.
The plausibility of this first interpretation relies
upon some means of resolving the suggestion that sets of
conscious experiences might not be recognized as distinct
sets. Presumably, subjects can integrate stimuli from dif-
ferent sense-modalities; they experience the stimuli, but
do not experience their integration. "Experience" is being
used here in two senses, one of which is presumably intro-
spectible and one of which is not. Given this equivocation,
split-brain patients can each be said to have unified con-
sciousness. This condition for the unity of consciousness
then appears to be markedly similar to the parallel-process
model of the unity of consciousness.
This reading probably amounts to a willful misreading
of Nagel's account, for Nagel does specify "a single mind has
sufficiently immediate access to its conscious states" (empha-
sis mine). Nagel, however, does not seem to have a clear con-
ception of conscious states, and his remarks leave open the
possibility that conscious states do not imply that the subject
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whose states those are, has consciousness of them. Nagel
writes
:
I do not wish to claim that the line between conscious
and unconscious mental activity is a sharp one. It
is even possible that the distinction is partly rela-
tive, in the sense that a given item of mental activity
may be assignable to consciousness or not, depending on
what other mental activities of the same person are
going on at the same time, and whether it is connected
with them in a suitable way. (p. 404 )
Nagel elsewhere mentions the possibility that "everyone has
two minds, but that we don't notice it except in these odd
cases because most pairs of minds in a single body run in
perfect parallel due to the direct communication between the
hemispheres which provides their anatomical bases" (p. 409 ).
Obviously, the crux of the problem here lies in determining
why we should be able to introspect conscious states, if our
ability to introspect them varies according to what other
mental activities are occurring concurrently. The truly in-
teresting problem concerns the relation of conscious states
to consciousness.
Unfortunately, on Nagel's account, this relation
appears to be closely tied to the problem of direct access,
or "sufficiently immediate access," and this is extremely
deceptive. Nagel compares direct access with integrated be-
havior, and this comparison can only lead to confusion. The
apparent integration of the overt behavior of split-brain
patients accustoms researchers to describe patients as single
subjects in ordinary situations, and as two subjects in ex-
perimental situations. But without some comprehensive account
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of the relation between the unity of consciousness and inte-
grated behavior, the inclusion of a criterion involving
direct access in descriptions of overt behavior is meaning-
less. Describing such access as 11 sufficiently immediate"
only compounds the problem, for this description leaves open
to question whether such access incompasses or excludes
strategies
.
If by "sufficiently immediate access," Nagel means to
require introspection, excluding strategies, then split-
brain patients are each invariably two subjects. Neither
hemisphere can introspect the other's mental states at all;
the failure to introspect is demonstrated by the confabula-
tory responses offered by the "verbal" hemisphere in explana-
tion of the activities of the other hemisphere. Confabulatory
responses are defined as the "chatty filling-in" of gaps in
experience. If introspection is required, the two hemispheres
do not comprise a single mind. However, if Nagel means to
permit the kind of strategies accessible to both hemispheres
to constitute sufficiently immediate access, accepting the
transfer of information across the body, then the patient
may meet Nagel's condition for possessing a single mind.
The patient meets this condition in a rather unorthodox man-
ner, as we are unaccustomed to voluntary physical actions as
comprising a form of mental access. It is of great importance
that one standard for the immediacy of access be applied to
subjects in both experimental and normal situations; the
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unorthodoxy of voluntary physical actions as comprising
mental access makes it difficult to remember to apply a uni-
form standard.
Nagel has difficulties in applying one standard con-
sistently to split-brain patients in both experimental and
normal situations; he appears to vacillate between the two
standards of immediacy. Nagel states "functions of the right
hemisphere are inaccessible not only to speech but to any
direct combination with corresponding functions of the left
hemisphere" (p. 405, emphasis mine). But Nagel suggests
later
:
There is little doubt that information from the two
sides of their brains can be pooled to yield inte-
grated behavioral control. And although this is not
accomplished by the usual methods, it is not clear
that this settles the question against assigning the
integrative functions to a single mind.
. . .
Never-
theless, if we assign the integrative functions to a
single mind, we must also ascribe the experimentally
evoked disassociation to that mind, and this is not
easy. (p. 40G)
Although Nagel appears here to be accepting behavioral inte-
gration as affording sufficiently immediate access, he argues
against this view by abandoning this view and endorsing some
other form of access. In arguing against this view, Nagel
explains why it is not easy to ascribe the experimentally
evoked disassociation to that mind; he writes, "there is
nothing about the experimental situation that might be ex-
pected to produce a fundamental internal change in the patient.
In fact, it produces no anatomical changes" (p. 408, emphasis
mine). This rejoinder can only be interpreted as evidence of
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a gross confusion of conditions of access, which results in
a confusion of mind and brain. If strategies are accepted
as constituting a form of mental access, then the prevention
of strategies cannot be described as a purely physical change*
their prevention constitutes a change in the mind. This
change requires neither internal nor anatomical changes.
If what is significant in the mind, is the transfer of
ormation
,
and no assumptions are made concerning the means
used to transmit that information, then the explanation for
the loss of interhemispheric integration in experimental
situations is obvious. The changes produced in the experi-
mental situation can be attributed to the blockage or satura-
tion of the bodily channels used in information transfer by
strategies. The cases demonstrating a loss of the ability
to respond in an integrated way, when strategies are disrupted,
is similar to the failure to respond normally shown by persons
whose central nervous systems cannot assimilate all the in-
formation they are given, or are not given enough information.
For example, stuttering and language difficulties result as
a consequence of forcing a person to switch "handedness,"
because both hemispheres give each other needless and dupli-
cated information; failure results because there is too much
information to be assimilated. Too little information, such
as results from other forms of disconnexion syndrome (e.g.,
loss of a visual association area) results in confabulatory
responses similar to those manifested by split-brain patients
in experimental situations in which strategies are prevented.
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Once the confusion engendered by a change in the condi-
tions for access to mental states is resolved, there is con-
sistently either one subject or two; we are no longer troubled
by minds "popping in and out of existence," and the unity of
consciousness is not a somehow transient phenomenon. But if
it appears that whether strategies can be permitted to consti-
tute access or not remains a decision question, this illusion
is only a consequence of our ignorance of the way strategies
function. The fundamental issue lies in assessing what
strategies do, to permit behavioral integration, aid why split-
brain patients do not experience the use of strategies in
their subjective experience; after all, strategies are based
upon voluntary action. Yet it appears to be voluntary action
which is not introspectible. It is the presumption that
voluntary action _is conscious action which gives this state-
ment its suggestion of paradox; we then appear to have con-
scious states which are not accessible to consciousness.
The suggestion that voluntary actions are conscious leads to
the view of strategies as observable by the split-brain sub-
jects, and the view that strategies are somehow observable
leads to the idea that strategies constitute inferences as
to the mental states of the opposite hemisphere. This view
lends the two-minds position much of its attractiveness ; it
offers the juxtaposition of direct access and inference which
forms one of our criteria for the individuation of mental
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subjects. In my next section, I argue that this view is
fundamentally mistaken. I demonstrate, using Nagel's five
alternative descriptions of split-brain patients, some of
the profound conceptual problems which this view faces.
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CONCLUSION: CONSCIOUS STATES AND CONSC IOUSNESS
The most fundamental issue in interpreting split-brain
experiments as demonstrating the possibility of multiple
consciousness, lies in the relation between conscious states
and the consciousness of those states. This relation is very
difficult to describe, partly because of the necessity to
rule out whatever conscious states originate in the midbrain,
but also because the human mind can discriminate "mental
events" at different levels of simplicity. We find the ina-
bility to introspect certain features of our experience
baffling. If we can see something at various levels of sim-
plicity or complexity, depending upon how much detail we wish
to discriminate, then we feel that we ought to be able to
recognize and introspect features of our conscious experience
of seeing that thing. Strategies used in split-brain experi-
ments are puzzling, because it seems that the subject must
either perform consciously and be aware of his use of strate-
gies, or must behave automatically. In the first case, split-
|ibrain patients have multiple introspectible consciousness;
in the second, they each have single minds. The interpreta-
tion which is offered, and the one which is perhaps best, is
one which can describe both hemispheres as capable of intelli-
gent, purposive action and then offer an account of our ex-
perience of that action.
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Nagel offers five different descriptions of the minds
of split-brain patients. They are the following:
1
.
^^
P
?>
tiefLhre .°ne fairly normal ™ind associatedwith^the left hemisphere, and the responses emanat-ing irom the nonverbal right hemisphere are the
responses of an automaton, and are not producedby conscious mental processes.
2.
The patients have only one mind, associated withthe left hemisphere, but there also occur (asso-
ciated with the right hemisphere) isolated con-
scious mental phenomena, not integrated into a
mind at all, though they can perhaps be ascribed
to the organism.
3.
The patients have two minds, one of which can talk
and one of which can't.
4.
They have one mind, whose contents derive from
botn hemispheres and are rather peculiar and
dissociated.
b. They have one normal mind most of the time, while
the hemispheres are functioning in parallel, but
two minds are elicited by the experimental situa-
tions which yield the interesting results (perhaps
the single mind splits in two and reconvenes after
the experiment is over).
Nagel's argument in rejecting these five alternatives relies
on the assumption that either the responses of the right
hemisphere are unconscious and automatic, or they are conscious.
Denying that the responses are unconscious and automatic,
Nagel is forced to affirm that they are conscious; he cannot
give an account of conscious experience which approximates
that of normal persons. Nagel postulates that these conscious
thoughts are isolated, or "peculiar and disassociated." But
Nagel does not appear to have an answer to the question: how
can these contents be experienced at all
,
if they are not
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integrated into the rest of experience? If these experi-
ences are isolated, disassociated or peculiar, the answer
appears to oe, tnat tney are not experienced; someone else,
or something else experiences these aspects of experience.
Nagel suggests that either the right hemisphere is con-
scious, or it is merely "a collection of unconscious automatic
responses." Nagel then argues against the possibility that
the activities ascribed to the right hemisphere could be
unconscious automatic responses. Nagel describes these
activities as "too elaborate, too intentionally directed,
and too psychologically intelligible" to be unconscious.
The fact that these responses are elaborate and intentionally
directed does not make them necessarily conscious. Kenneth
Sayre has pointed out in Consciousness: A Philosophic Study
o_f_ Minds and Machines
,
that purposeful activity need not be
conscious. Sayre points out that certain animals manifest
elaborate and intentionally directed forms of behavior, and
yet we ascribe the behavior to instinct, and question whether
the animals are conscious. The difficulty in interpreting
the responses of the right hemisphere as collections of un-
conscious automatic responses lies in accepting them as auto-
matic. Nagel's use of the term "automaton" rather prejudges
the issue; if these responses are described as evincing common
and familiar actions, to which we are so habituated that we
are capable of performing them without consciously attending
to our performances, then this alternative is much more
attractive.
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Moreover, nothing Nagel offers as an activity perform-
able by the right hemisphere exceeds this ability. The right
hemisphere responds to complex visual and auditory stimuli.
Nagel states that the right hemisphere also responded to
language, but the patients' language ability in this hemi-
sphere was interestingly limited. Patients responded to
nouns, but not to verbs. Oddly, the patients responded cor-
rectly to nouns such as "butter," "letter," etc., but not
to similar nouns derived from verbs, such as "fighter,"
"locker," etc. Gazzaniga states in The Bisected Drain (p. 119)
"there was no evidence that verbs were understood or compre-
hended at all." If the possibility is allowed that the right
hemisphere functions intelligently in integrating these
stimuli, and in performing certain actions, then there is
less resistance to the concept of "unconscious responses."
The difficulty with this view is that it is hard to
reconcile purposeful attentive action with the requirement
that the subject cannot be conscious of those actions. If
the behavior is intelligent, then it seems that it must be at
least potentially conscious; if the actions performed (appar-
ently by the right hemisphere) are merely actions to which we
are, perhaps, habituated, then they are in some sense volun-
tary and ought to be such that we are at least capable of
introspecting them, or being self-conscious of them.
Nagel's second possibility allows that the right hemi-
sphere's activities are conscious, without belonging to a mind
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at all. There are difficulties with this view; chiefly, the
possibility that there are conscious states that do not be-
long to a mind seems unintelligible. Nagel wants to refute
a view similar to that just presented in rebuttal of his
first proposal; he wants to argue against the view that the
activities of the right hemisphere merely represent slices
of purposeful behavior. The issue in question is whether a
system capable of "carrying out tasks which require the inte-
gration of diverse psychological determinants" must con-
sciously integrate those determinants, or at least, must be
capable of consciously integrating those determinants.
Nagel appears to presuppose this conscious integration in
arguing that the right hemisphere's activities belong to a
subject of experience and action.
Perhaps the most obvious point is one made in Section 3
it is at best problematic to assert that the right hemisphere
independently carries out such tasks. It is questionable
whether any integration of "psychological determinants" is
performed by the right hemisphere alone. VJhat may perhaps
be conceded is that the right hemisphere independently ex-
periences consciousness' "simplest elements, the raw sensa-
tions like the color red, for example, the colors, sounds,
taste, touch, and smell" (Sperry, "Brain Bisection and the
Mechanisms of Consciousness," p. 313); the ability to experi-
ence such sensations can surely proceed in parallel, without
disturbing anyone's concept of consciousness.
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And so, we are left with Nagel's fifth alternative.
The hemispheres function in parallel. An explanation can
be given for the apparent appearance of two minds in experi-
mental situations; it has been presented in Section 4.
Strategies constitute a form of mental access, and their
disruption causes a loss of integrated activity at least
with regard to the activity being tested; aspects of behav-
ior unaffected by the experiment continue undisturbed. The
fundamental problem with this account is that although it
offers a solution, the connection between integrated behav-
ior and our experience of it, depends upon structuring a
situation into a context in the light of our goals.
Although it is relatively easy to demonstrate the
difficulty of establishing that the hemispheres of a split-
brain patient's brain could have divergent goals, this demon-
stration does not suffice to show that the hemispheres could
not have divergent goals. The primary weakness of the
description given, in which split-brain patients do not sub-
jectively experience disunity, lies in the possibility that
split-brain subjects are two different subjects, or do di-
verge to become two different subjects during experimental
situations. If split-brain patients each had two sets of
goals, generally uniform but occasionally distinct, then
perhaps they would each be two subjects, or would diverge
to become two subjects when attempting to work toward those
goals. The difficulty in refuting this possibility is that
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no appeal can be made to the patients' sub] ective experience.
But the possibility that the patients are each two sub-
jects is not an attractive view to defend, nonetheless.
On this view, it is difficult to explain the ability of the
hemispheres to function together. In order to perform strate-
gies m situations in which the hemispheres' access to the
perceptual input available to the opposite hemisphere is
deliberately restricted by the experimenter, the hemispheres
can devise fairly sophisticated strategies. On the two-
minds view, the ability to perform strategies of this kind
is problematic. It is difficult to grasp how the two hemi-
spheres could structure a situation independently so that
the lack of information from one hemisphere to the other
could be informative. The problem with an interesting defense
of the two-minds view, lies in explaining the significance
of negative information in response latencies. Given the
view that there are two minds, which somehow observe each
other, and make inferences (which at least in principle are
introspectible
) ,
from the actions of the opposite "side,"
accounting for the ability to make inferences when the other
side did literally nothing is difficult.
A somewhat burlesqued example can be given of this
point. In one of Arthur Conan Doyle's stories ("The Case of
Silver Blaze"
) ,
there is a famous exchange in which Sherlock
Holmes refers to "the curious incident of the dog in the
night." When someone states "the dog did nothing in the
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night;," Holmes replies "that was the curious incident."
Taken literally, this exchange suggests an interpretation
worthy of Fridugis
; "nothing" obviously names something, or
refers to something, in this case a very significant action
by the watch-dog in the case. But that the dog did not do
something (namely, bark at an intruder) is significant only
in the context of certain expectations.
The same point can be made of split-brain patients;
in those experiments upon which the two-mind view depends,
there must be a context of shared expectation in order for
the feedback strategies to work. Either the experimental
subjects' hemispheres independently perceive the same aspects
of the situation as significant because they share the same
purposes, or because the experimental situation is itself so
structured that each hemisphere perceives what is required
of it. The first alternative suggests a unanimity of pur-
pose which suggests a pre-established harmony, if the ability
to perceive the situation as significant really depends on
the subjects. The second alternative depends on the ability
of the sides to respond to a situation, in which their tasks
somehow can be grasped and performed solely in the context
provided by the experiment. Because the situations cannot
be so perceived by the hemispheres independently, and because
they frequently rely upon the ability to contrast or compare
isolated objects, this explanation is inadequate. But if in
this latter situation, the subjects are postulated to share
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an understanding of the purpose of the experiment, then the
situation is simply that described in terms of the resolu-
tion of redundancy of potential command. There is no need
to postulate that split-brain patients each have two minds.
The suggestion that split-brain patients have two
minds requires the individuation of perceptions (including
somesthetic sensations), purposes, etc. into two distinct
sets, as well as an explanation of the fact that these sets
must overlap and share identical members. It requires an
explanation of the internal coherence of one of these sets,
and either an account of the internal coherence of the other
or an explication of its somewhat anomalous status vis-a-vis
the other. Although the account of the relation of "the
naive attitude" and the possibility of reflective awareness
offered by the parallel-process explication of consciousness
could use improvement, the account offered in the two-minds
view shares those difficulties and adds others of its own.
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